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1. Introduction
Semiotics has a long tradition as the science of signs, signification and meaning‐making. Four 
traditions have contributed to Western semiotics: semantics (including the philosophy of lan‐
guage), logic, rhetoric and hermeneutics. However, both John Deely and Umberto Eco [1, 2] 
have claimed the need to re‐read the history of philosophy, and maybe of other disciplines, 
from a semiotic point of view. This volume shows that there are many other fields contribut‐
ing to make semiotics an interdisciplinary arena and an ever‐growing field of interest.
In the Western world, the first semiotic incursions can be traced back to the Greeks. Before 
contemporary semioticians raised the question of the powerful action and “affordances” of 
signs (see below for this concept), there were phenomena considered “significant” in three 
main contexts: poetics (and linguistics), logic (and philosophy) and medicine. This introduc‐
tory paper shows how knowledges from the past haunt the present and future of semiotics in 
various ways. The reflection functions as a catalyst to connect the diverse papers collected in 
this volume, contributing to point out the contemporary relevance of semiotics and its inter‐
disciplinary applications.
The subtitle “of ghosts and machines” refers to a phrase used by Oxford professor of philoso‐
phy Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976) to capture the Cartesian idea of a soul/mind within the body/
machine, which he employed to criticize materialist theories that reduce mental activity to 
physical reality. The phrase was later popularized by Hungarian‐British journalist Arthur 
Koestler (1905–1983) who borrowed it for his 1967 book The Ghost in the Machine, where his 
central concern was the controversy over auto‐replicative forms of intelligence in the human 
brain. The phrase has acquired new meanings in artificial intelligence. It was used by Arthur 
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C. Clarke in his (1982) novel 2010: Odyssey Two, by Stephen King in his 1991 serial novel The 
Dark Tower, and more recently, by Japanese artist Masamune Shirow for his manga Ghost in 
the Shell and its movie adaptations. The evolution of the topic shows concern over the possibil‐
ity of cyber‐brains and the symbiosis of the human and the machine, throwing light on some 
key aspects of the contemporary debate on semiotics.
Indeed, cybernetic advance is so rapid that there is already software that tracks the electrical 
activity of human nervous systems, collecting patterns of thoughts and emotions in order to 
map entire human life experiences, turning them into searchable data (i.e., the British Telecom 
“Soul Catcher” computer chip). In the move towards “Silicon Souls“, research on biomecha‐
tronics developed at MIT lab (http://biomech.media.mit.edu/) will allow a new generation 
of prosthesis by means of a dynamic socket that maps nerve and muscle movements in the 
amputee’s body. These prostheses are extensions of the body as much as of the mind, since 
they map machine algorithms upon artificial limbs. All these contemporary immersive tech‐
nologies explore the imbrication of digital simulations with body schemata. Furthermore, 
in the race to connect the world, the InterPlaNet (IPN) initiative launched by NASA in 1998 
offers a computer networking protocol designed to operate at interplanetary distances (http://
ipnsig.org/), not just “connecting people“, but connecting galaxies.
Let me turn for a minute to the etymology of the word “ghost”. According to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, the term originates in Proto‐Germanic Gaisto‐z, which in Old English 
became gāst and gáest (Exeter Book) and Geist in German, meaning “breath”, in the sense of 
disembodied spirit of a dead person that inhabits a body and might be good or bad. It later 
acquired religious and psychological overtones as “psyche”, “soul” and “vital principle”. 
According to Sir James Frazer, the “ghost” is a sort of creature that animates de body, escaping 
it temporarily during sleep and permanently in death: death being the permanent absence of 
the soul, he explains in The Golden Bough. The similarities with Proto‐Indo‐European *ǵʰeysd‐, 
*ǵʰisd‐ (“anger, agitation”), *ǵʰyis‐ (“bewildered, frightened”) and *ǵʰey‐ (“to propel, move, 
spin”) should also to be noted.
Alongside “ghost“, the Greek term phántasma originally meant to “make visible” or “bring to 
light”, and it is related to contemporary terms such as “appearance” “image“, “phantom” or 
“fantasy“, all of which entered Western languages through Latin. As in the case of “ghost“, it 
came to mean “soul” and “spirit”, maintaining a religious significance as in the Bible (i.e., “the 
Holy Ghost”; in Latin Spiritus Sanctus).
Continuing our incursion on etymological roots, the origin of the term semiotics shows inter‐
esting parallels that make obvious the human desire to transcend death through memory 
and representation, that is, the use of signs that try to make present that which is absent. 
In Jacques Derrida’s terms, “logocentrism” would be a characteristic pattern of the Western 
world. He also used the term “hauntology” in his 1993 book Spectres of Marx, following a 
reference to “spectre” made by Marx himself in his The Communist Manifesto [3]. Derrida also 
echoes Shakespeare’s Hamlet in order to explain that re‐presentation is a form of making pres‐
ent an absent past by means of different sets of signs. He argues that the attempt to isolate 
social (history) or individual identity is always futile because it is “always already” (he uses 
this term to capture the idea of the past living in the present) dependent of semiotic systems 
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where meaning is deferred, subject to interpreting actions. According to Derrida, the sign/
signifier can never capture the object/signified in its totality because we are not talking of 
essences but of complex processes that encompass many dimensions, as well as various forms 
of temporality.
Indeed, the haunting figure of the ghost sign, simultaneously absent and present, dead and 
alive, was always already there in the etymology of the term semiotics. The Greek noun sêma 
appears in ancient texts (i.e., Homer and Hesiod) with the sense “tomb/burial ground” as well 
as with the meaning of natural or conventional signal. After the sixth century BCE, the term 
semeîon, which originates from sêma, was commonly used by Aeschylus, Aesop, Hecataeus of 
Miletus, Anaxagoras or Cleostratus, and it comes to mean “symbol” and “sign of a god” as 
well as “indication” and “proof”. It coexists with tékmor, found in The Iliad with the meaning 
of “proof” and eventually “sign” and “indication” (Iliad, I, 526; VII, 30; IX, 48; IX, 418; IX, 685; 
XIII, 20; cited in Castañares 2012) [4]. According to Detienne and Vernant, these terms were 
also used in fortune telling, astronomy and navigation, referring to signals coming from the 
gods and alluding to cunning knowledge associated with the goddess Metis (pp. 168–169) [5].
The term tékmor evolved towards techné in the context of medicine during the fifth century 
BCE and the beginning of the fourth, when Hippocrates’ disciples compiled the chief trea‐
tises of the Corpus Hippocraticum. According to these treatises, doctors were able to identify a 
specific type of signs (semeîa) through which they were able to conclude the health or illness 
of individuals. The medical method of establishing conjectures (tekmaíresthai) for diagnosis 
departed from the analogical deductive procedure used in philosophy and which rested on 
the notion of phýsis as a cosmos (a whole finished reality, arranged by laws that were repli‐
cated at the human microcosmic level). Hippocratic medicine described inferential semiotics 
when it explained how semeîa moves beyond mere conjecture to become semeîon and gain the 
sense of proof (tekmérion) [4].
Aristotle’s contribution to semiotics had already clarified that signs are demonstrative propo‐
sitions that might (or might not) acquire meaning to someone. Beyond causality relations, 
statements can constitute the premises of a syllogism and, as such, they can become conven‐
tional cultural signs whose paradigm is the “word”. However, they may also lack a specific 
name (anónimon) and therefore be refutable (Rhetoric I, 2, 1357 a 34 ff.). For instance, the fact 
that Socrates was wise and just is a (anonymous) sign that wise men are just (1357b pp. 11–13) 
[6]. Although in his Poetics (1456 b 20–21), Aristotle’s attempts to define various terms related 
to the field of logic and semiotics, a clearer allusion appears in Perihermenias or De interpre‐
tatione, where he puts forth the explicit opposition between words and things (lógos and ón), 
already prefigured in Plato. One of the fragments presents an early description of triadic 
semiotics (Deely p. 76) [7].
“Now spoken sounds (ta en têi phonêi) are symbols (sýmbola) of affections (pathématon) in the 
soul, and written marks (ta graphómena) symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks 
are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place 
signs (semeîa prótos) of – affections of the soul – are the same for all; and what these affections 
are likenesses (omoiómata) of – actual things (prágmata) – are also the same.” (De interpretatione 
16a 3–8) [7].
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After the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE and the emergence of the Roman Empire, 
Greek civilization entered the Hellenistic Age, a period marked by battles and territorial shifts 
which lasted until the Roman conquest of Ptolemaic Egypt in the first century BCE. Many 
sources were lost during this period, either because of war or because of lack of interest in 
scribal preservation.
In the second century CE, Claudius Galenus synthetized Hippocratic medicine and the 
philosophical thoughts of Plato and Aristotle to include the advancement of technology into 
the inferential process of medical diagnosis (diagnostikón meros tes technes), coining the term 
semeíosis.
In the 1750s, a series of excavations that took place at Herculaneum (an ancient Roman town 
located at the skirts of Mount Vesuvius and covered with debris after the 79 CE eruption) 
unveiled a great collection papyrus.1 Among these, there was a treatise by Epicurean philoso‐
pher Philodemus of Gadara (c. 100–35 BCE) probably entitled Perì semeîon kai semeióseon (On 
Signs and Sign Inferences), known now by its abbreviated title, De Signis. The treatise contains 
a variation of the term semeióseos, from which C.S. Peirce would derive semiosis [8, 9]. As in 
Aristotle, for Philodemus, common signs cannot be taken as valid inferential premises, as 
can particular or necessary signs (anankastikón). The treatise preserves the controversy on the 
validity of sign inference which took place between Epicureans and Stoics in order to estab‐
lish the type of “proof” to determine the difference between signs. While the Stoics defended 
deductive inferences established from a priori principles, the Epicureans trusted empirical 
inductive testing.
Greek reflections on the nature and purpose of sign systems and their relations to differ‐
ent types of knowledge has continued to “haunt” Western thought for centuries. Thus, 
scholasticism and medieval semiotics developed within theology and the trivium of the 
three liberal arts, concerned primarily with textual exegesis and hermeneutics: grammar, 
dialectic (logic) and rhetoric. During this period, realist and nominalist positions debated 
over the existence (or not) of universals. A proponent of nominalism, William of Ockham 
(1285–1349) considered universals to be signs without an existence of their own, but stand‐
ing for individual objects. Conceptualism, held by Peter Abelard (1079–1142), Albert the 
Great (1200–1280) and Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), was accepted as a synthesis of the two 
positions, with universals are also mind‐dependent but formed by similarities with real 
things of a common form.
A new era of interest and research on the nature of signs began in the ages of rationalism and 
British empiricism. The period showed a shift from analogic reasoning towards the expres‐
sion of knowledge as both analytic and referential practice, where representation stems in the 
observer’s perceiving/thinking mind (subject of enunciation) and gradually shifts to a more 
abstract mode, where the word/sign and the phenomenon/matter are brought to coincide in 
the act of mimetic representation. This move was also associated with an epistemological 
shift: from the perceiving subject to the observed empirical object (experiment) [10]. The use 
1http://www.herculaneum.ox.ac.uk/http://163.1.169.40/cgi‐bin/library?e=d‐000‐00‐‐‐0PHerc‐‐00‐0‐0‐‐0prompt‐10‐‐‐4‐‐‐‐‐‐
0‐1l‐‐1‐en‐50‐‐‐20‐about‐‐‐00031‐001‐1‐0utfZz‐8‐00&a=d&c=PHerc&cl=CL5.1
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of optic technologies and lenses employed in instruments such as the telescope, developed by 
Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) and Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), enabled this viewing transition, 
just as the screens of computers, tablets and smart phones open contemporary worlds to the 
virtual cyber‐sphere.
In spite of Galileo’s innovative engineering, his methods were based largely on the theo‐
ries of analogy, proportion and inverse proportion, passed, on by the Italian mathematician 
Leonardo Fibonacci of Pisa (1175–1250) as well as the Egyptian‐Greek architect known as 
Euclid (c. 300 BCE). A new translation of his book of Elements was published in 1543, only 
some 20 years before Galileo’s birth. It had the advantage of coming from a Latin version 
based on an earlier Greek source, rather than via Arabic translations. I bring to the fore these 
issues of translation and the differences in symbolic representation because the late 1500s 
and early 1600s mark the expansion of Gutenberg printing press as well as the rupture of the 
ancient unity between calculation, natural philosophy and alphabetic writing [11].
The ensuing separation continued to pose the problem in philosophical debates between 
demonstrative and dialectical reasoning, as scholars tried to explain how singular items of 
experience were part of universal knowledge, a problem explored by Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz (1646–1716). Mathematician and author of Alice Adventures in Wonderland, Charles 
Lutwidge Dodgson, better known as Lewis Carroll, confronted the problem in his Tangled 
Tales. In Principles of Mathematics (1901), Bertrand Russell continued to face a similar chal‐
lenge: Whether the class of all classes [now called ‘sets’] is or is not a member of itself [12, 13].
The analytico‐referential form of reasoning developed after René Descartes (1596–1650) tried 
to explain the connection between the physical body, much like a machine, separated from 
the “spirit” or “soul” that animated the mind. In The Description of the Human Body, he argued 
that the mind regulates the body through the pineal gland, which he considered the “seat 
of the soul”. His idea of innate human knowledge led John Locke (1632–1704) to combat 
Cartesian deduction with inductive empiricism. Limitations arose in both cases, as knowl‐
edge was treated as an object, thus creating a boundary between the liminal being, of which 
one is conscious, and the ineffable being (the sublime) for which there was no articulation 
(Reiss p. 39) [10].
The semiotics of George Berkeley (1685–1753) maintained that words do not always stand 
for ideas and that they have other functions such as referring to passions. Johann Gottfried 
Herder (1744–1803) sustained that human cognitive capacity only has access to the exterior 
marks of things (signs) and that these do not express the things themselves, only their names. 
Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) Critique of Pure Reason (1781) postulated basic conceptual catego‐
ries of human thought as a priori tools for making sense of the world. To Kant, these catego‐
ries exist independently of human experience; the image (Bild) was a category of perception, 
while a priori concepts formed part of ‘pure reason’. This topic was also explored by Gotthold 
Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781) in his work Laocoon, a prominent example of the study of ico‐
nicity in the arts. A precursor of the studies on iconicity was Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), 
whose philosophy was also influential upon Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775–1854) or 
Novalis (1772–1801), and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) and, more specifically, 
Bernard Bolzano (1781–1848) continued to develop a pragmatic dimension of semiosis by 
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exploring different types of signs from the point of view of perception (visual and auditory 
signs, gestural and verbal signs).
In the twentieth century, the study of semiotics takes a definite impulse. Victoria Lady Welby 
(1837–1912) has been recently acknowledged an important female precursor. In Philosophical 
Investigations, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) developed a phenomenological theory of signs 
and meaning which explored the phenomenon of awareness and attention. Husserl argued 
that some phenomena are not immediately perceived in themselves. Such assertion already 
implied a gap between the objects as sign (signifier) and as thing (signified). Under the impe‐
tus of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), Louis Trolle Hjelmslev (1899–1965) and Algirdas 
Julien Greimas (1917–1992), the European structural approach relied on the supremacy of 
discourse and emphasized the dyadic correspondence between the material sign (signifier) 
and its referent (signified). It was later criticized under poststructural and deconstructive 
criticism (i.e., Derrida above). The North‐American triadic approach, developed by Harvard 
pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) and Charles William Morris (1901–1979), as 
well as Italian semiotician Umberto Eco (1932–2016), went beyond the scholastic conception 
of reference aliquid stat pro aliquo and placed attention on the role of the user in the process of 
sense‐making and interpreting, establishing three semiotic moments of reference: the mate‐
rial sign vehicle, the object it refers to, and the decoding “interpretant”. Peircean semiotics, 
as both metaphysics and epistemology, reconfigures any simple binary distinction between 
phenomena (sensation, perception) and noumena (unmediated referent or event that exists 
without sense or perception) as an irreducible triadic relationship [14].
In the years of expansion of Claude Shannon’s information theory, Eco insisted in distin‐
guishing between a semiotics of communication, multidimensional, always intentional and 
based on a shared code by transmitter and receiver, and a semiotics of meaning which only 
required an intelligent consciousness at the reception pole, not requiring a transmitter that 
would transmit signs and signals willingly. Likewise, the members of the Palo Alto “Invisible 
College” who came from various fields but mainly from anthropology, sociology and psy‐
chology (i.e., Gregory Bateson 1904–1980, Paul Watzlawick 1921–2007 and Erving Goffman 
1922–1982, among others) confronted the mathematical theory of information systems and 
defended the social aspects of human communication as a matrix that encompasses all human 
activities, a permanent social process that integrates intentional behaviour, with orchestral 
forms of verbal and non‐verbal communication (i.e., kinesthetics, proxemics, etc.; Matterart 
pp. 51–54) [15]. This interest for the intentional aspects of communication gradually gave way 
to the theory of affordances [16].
Anthropologist Marcel Danesi, editor of the world’s leading journal “Semiotica”, sees semiot‐
ics as an interdisciplinary Web, following his mentor and collaborator Thomas Sebeok (1920–
2001). This “Semiotic Web” provides the interconnectivity of sign systems not just in the milieu 
of cultural representations but also in nature, embracing recent cybernetic theories of embodi‐
ment and performance coming from biosemiotics and the neurosciences. In Sebeok’s view, 
the term “semiology” only captured the anthropocentric part of the discipline [17]. Sebeok’s 
ideas coincided with the development of cybernetics, defined by Norbert Wiener in 1948 as 
the scientific study of control and communication in the animal and the machine. The term 
“cybernetic” comes from Greek kybernetike meaning “governance” as well as “steering” (in 
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navigation). Metaphors of navigation are frequently used when referring to moving within 
the encrypted codes of the World Wide Web. In contemporary Data Mining, semiotic model‐
ling is used to map concepts into measurable variables through specific diagnostic criteria, 
and establish their specificity in relation to contextual interpretation. For instance, Sebeok’s 
and Danesi’s modelling systems theory (MST) distinguishes representations that include a 
singularized (sign), a composite (text) or cohesive form (code) [18, 19].
Ronald Stamper, a British pioneer in the field of semiotics as applied to informational systems, 
also stresses the importance of “signs” as fundamental units in computer science. Stamper 
incorporated Speech Act theory (i.e., Austin and Searle) in his Organizational Semiotics meth‐
odology. Methods for Eliciting, Analysing and Specifying Users’ Requirements (MEASUR) is 
used to incorporate technical and social aspects of communication in data mining models 
corresponding to three fundamental domains: application domain (i.e., medicine), the com‐
putational domain (where mathematical codes correspond to concepts in the application 
domain), and the implementation or “empirical” domain (physical properties of sign and 
signal transmission and storage). This last aspect was added by Stamper to the traditional 
semiotic division of syntactic, semantic and pragmatic concerns, including a “social” level for 
shared understanding above the level of pragmatics [20].
Since the 1990s, with the advent of the digital revolution, the discussion has shifted towards 
the inclusion of tools and machines in human lives, and how new technologies might impact 
meaning making and operate as semiotic instruments, embodying the ghost in the machine. 
Contemporary trends in semiotics explore interactions between living systems, organisms 
and their environments, following the pioneering work of Jacob Von Uexküll (1864–1944). 
These approaches have culminated in perception‐action (sensory‐motor integration‐mirror 
neuron structures) approach, which stresses the role of observers/users around the concept of 
“affordance” (experience from previous interactions with the world) and the active task‐ori‐
ented sense‐making anticipated by Gibson [16]. Instead of conceiving living systems in terms 
of their reactions to external stimuli, in these approaches, it is important to pay attention to 
their constructed internal model of the world and the relation between sensing, desiring and 
acting. Interestingly, Marx’s spectre lucks behind the theory of affordances as it can be seen 
in the following passage.
“Since the relative form of value of a commodity—the linen, for example— expresses the 
value of that commodity, as being something wholly different from its substance and prop‐
erties, as being, for instance, coat‐like, we see that this expression itself indicates that some 
social relation lies at the bottom of it. With the equivalent form it is just the contrary. The very 
essence of this form is that the material commodity itself—the coat—just as it is, expresses 
value, and is endowed with the form of value by Nature itself. Of course this holds good only 
so long as the value relation exists, in which the coat stands in the position of equivalent to 
the linen. Since, however, the properties of a thing are not the result of its relations to other 
things, but only manifest themselves in such relations, the coat seems to be endowed with 
its equivalent form, its property of being directly exchangeable, just as much by Nature as it 
is endowed with the property of being heavy, or the capacity to keep us warm” (p. 66) [21].
Another spectre is that of Aristotle, who struggled to define the affordances of knowledge, truth 
and the “soul” in his Nicomachean Ethics (Book VI, Ch. 3). He spoke of epistēmē (1139 b 18–36) 
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or universal knowledge, shared, circulated and preserved in cultural memory and heritage; 
techne (Nicomachean Ethics 1140 a 1–23), skills or capacities to accomplish tasks that operate on 
variable spheres, and related in chapter 4 to a trained capacity to create through reason (logos); 
and, in other words, knowledge of specific principles and patterns, and frequently translated 
as “craft” or “art” in its meaning of systematic use of organizational know‐how or codified 
knowledge oriented towards intelligent human action. And finally, he also defined phronesis 
(Nicomachean Ethics 1140 a 24–1140 b 12) as a sort of practical wisdom and idiosyncratic knowl‐
edge that comes from life experiences as a result of trial and error; to some extent, it is intuitive 
and cannot be shared. Aristotle distinguished phronesis from sophia (theoretical wisdom, which 
involves epistemic reasoning) and held that these types of knowledge corresponded to three 
basic human activities: theoria (thinking), aimed at universal knowledge and truth, poïesis (mak‐
ing), whose end goal is production, and praxis, the objective of which is doing or action [6].
In recent discussions of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, such as the collection edited by Alan G. Gross and 
Arthur E. Walzer (2000), phronesis is discussed in relation to an older quality, metis or conjec‐
tural intelligence, personal mode of knowledge encapsulated in practice, and popular in the 
Mycenae civilization, and attributed to figures such as Prometheus and Odysseus/Ulysses, 
the paragon of craftiness and cunning [22]. Drawing on work by Detienne and Vernant, metis 
has been found to exemplify and earlier form of world knowledge prior to the development 
of the synthesis of Platonist and Aristotelian models [5]. Carolyn R. Miller writes that this 
“conjectural worldview concerns the individual case, rather than universal knowledge, prob‐
ability rather than certainty, qualitative rather than cumulative or quantifiable information, 
and inferential rather than deductive thought” (p. 138) [23].
Thus, rapidly shifting and disconcerting apprehensions of reality require both conjectural 
knowledge (metis) and practical intelligence (techne) targeted at concrete decisions. Some 
scholars (notably Stephen Gaukroger) have noted that when knowledge shifts occur, and a 
new cluster of concepts emerge. In the case discussed, the notion of epistēmē took over metis 
(p. 42) [24]. In the introduction to the thematic issue of the journal Icono 14, “Technopoïesis: 
Transmedia Mythologisation and the Unity of Knowledge” (2017), co‐authored with Henry 
Sussman, we attempted to show, following Foucault’s L’Archéologie du Savoir or Timothy Reiss 
among others [25, 26], the co‐existence and shifting of different epistēmēs as power‐knowledge 
systems, visible for instance in the transition that took place in the late medieval and early 
Renaissance Europe with the combination of Neo‐Platonism and Aristotelianism [27].
In his contribution to the International Handbook of Semiotics (2015), Deely traced back to 
Aristotle the premodern background of the semiotic triangle and explained how translations 
overlooked certain expressions referring to a kind of collective consciousness (a hauntology?) 
prior to the development of individual self‐awareness:
“In terms of the (lost) terminology, the passiones animae or “passions of the soul” are the forms 
of specification (species impressae) for developing thought which have their origin in the action 
of sensible things upon the senses, as these stimuli are further developed or shaped by the 
active interpretative response of the internal sense of memory, imagination, and estimation 
that together, or “collectively” constitute, on the side of animal Innenwelt, the foundations or 
basis (species expressae, or “phantasms”) for the relations to the environment constituting the 
animal’s objective world, the Umwelt” (p. 67).
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As John Derbyshire’s contribution to The Spectator (June 5, 2014), “Chasing down the Ghost 
in the Machine” shows the controversy on the seat of consciousness remains [28]. Writing 
also in 2014, semiotician Paul Cobley emphasizes the role of biosemiotics in challenging the 
mechanist worldview and placing consciousness in relation to nature and in a continuum 
with plant‐animal existence. To Cobley, biosemiotics also serves to question the role of agency 
as inherently human and shows that different forms of agency can be found at very lower 
biological levels in the most rudimentary of organisms [29].
Introduced by Jakob von Uexküll (1936, 1937), the idea of Umwelt is pivotal in biosemiotics. 
For some scholars, it is the ‘world’ of signs which an animal creates/inhabits according to its 
sensorium. According to Sebeok, the Umwelt can be understood as a ‘model’ that allows an 
organism to survive (avoid predation, seek out comfort and nourishment, reproduce etc.) 
[30]. The perception‐action shift has placed semiotics at the centre of phenomenal apprehen‐
sion, and meaning making as a subjective mapping‐function of (interpreter) intentionality and 
action‐oriented survival. The object is also invested with perceptual‐effector potentialities 
that capture interpretive action and reflect human desires [27].
The emphasis on performative models that stress the ‘actant/agent/user’ is also visible in rela‐
tion to the tools and machines we use. Since the publication of Philip Johnson‐Laird’s theory 
of Mental Models, [31] there has been much discussion and use of the theory of “affordances” 
and mental models in human‐computer interaction and usability, as shown in several paper 
in this volume, which address the debate between the compatibility of mental models and 
formal rules of inferential logic. In recent years, software tools capable of capturing and ana‐
lysing the structural and functional properties of mental models are being designed [32]. The 
study of semiotics and the concept of “affordance” is relevant to these fields with regards 
to the semantic and pragmatic possibilities of task‐oriented sense‐making approaches, con‐
ceived in terms of their constructed internal model (Innenwelt‐eventually Umwelt in biose‐
miotics), as applied to very different fields such as Psychology, Linguistics, Philosophy of 
Language or Computer Programming. The application of the concept of “affordance” in the 
context of human‐machine interaction in Donald Norman’s The Design of Everyday Things 
(1988) opened semiotics to areas involved in user‐centred‐design, manipulation interfaces, 
cognitive engineering, modelling systems, organizational semiotics, and so on, some of which 
are addressed in this volume. The complex relation of distinctive semiotic affordances (poten‐
tials and constraints for making meaning) intention, and intermedial variability, alongside 
questions of social usability in particular contexts, have caused the category of design to move 
into the foreground of attention in semiotics [33].
Since the 1990s, the widespread use of computer systems has contributed to the development 
of systemic approaches that contemplate knowledge as made of various (fractal) levels of 
communication structures; dynamic open systems with permeable interdisciplinary borders 
which include ideological, political, economic and axiological structures. Very importantly, 
because all human actions are increasingly performed by means of digital instruments, the 
changes point in the direction of a huge shift in the ontology of symbolization, involving the 
foundation of design, development, and evaluation of visualization systems from a semiotic 
perspective. Thus, the present volume includes various papers on Organisational Semiotics 
(OS) in Building Information Modelling (BIM), and Functional Requirements Classification 
Models and Operational Approaches to Conceptual Understanding.
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Immersed as we are in the digital revolution, the pedagogic significance of images cannot be 
underestimated. The corpus of learning resources relies more and more on graphics, charts 
and icons than it ever did before. Once the amount of content in the World Wide Web has 
reached saturation levels, design practices are oriented towards the transformation of con‐
tent and its replication (re‐mediation/transmediation) in various semiotic multimodal for‐
mats. The image is possibly the most prominent one. Different gains and losses take place 
when the actions involved in using an artefact are captured onto an image, as it may happen 
in the context of teaching technological subjects such as physics or mathematics. Debates 
on the effects of these changes upon representation, and their impact on learning practices 
have ranged from views on the catastrophe of image‐dominance for literary and cognition, 
to expressions of enthusiasm and attempts to elucidate the effects of the distinctive semi‐
otic affordances (potentials and constraints for making meaning) amid diverse media for‐
mats. As pointed out above, the foregrounding of ‘design’ as a crucial semiotic category, 
also implies a conceptual shift from the idea of learning competences (in relation to specific 
educational practices conceived in terms of understanding and following particular conven‐
tions) to a focus on agency at both ends of the semiotic chain. Thus, various papers in the 
volume develop the topic of science education, conceptual change and teaching methods 
and approaches.
As a conclusion, this introduction has provided a framework for the papers included in this 
collection. A common thread is the delimitation of interdisciplinary borders at the material 
level of physical reality as well as in their semio‐cognitive and cultural implications. Semiotics 
continues to provide a framework for emerging knowledge traditions, extending its limits to 
the non‐human realm of biosemiotics and cybernetics, without completely disregarding the 
hauntings of the past. As body schema expands to its non‐human and posthuman dimen‐
sions, we need to keep chasing the ghost in the machine.
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